Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| de re, philosophy: statements that refer to non-linguistic objects are de re. Here, most authors assume that the ascribed properties are contingent. An exception is essentialism which ascribes certain necessary properties to objects. See also de dicto, necessity de re, contingency, modality, essentialism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Robert Brandom on de re - Dictionary of Arguments
I 695 Champagne - Example: > difference de re / de dicto. De re/de dicto-Example: In 2000, the President of the United States will be black. De dicto: The sentence "The President is Black" will be true in 2000. De re: Bill Clinton turns black. --- Rorty VI ~ 185 De re-attributions: express our nonrelativistic definitions in as far as that a certain way of speaking is better suited than others in order to talk about what there really is(!). E.g. "Ptolemy claimed that the orbits of the planets resulted from the movement of crystal balls" (according to Rorty). With de-re - attributions: he wants to re-introduce the old distinction between subjective/objective. >Subjectivity, >Objectivity. --- Brandom I 695 De re/Brandom: true: "he did not believe the inventor of the lightning rod to be the inventor of the ..." - de dicto: false: that the inventor of the lightning rod had not invented the lightning rod. I 689 Quine: Expressions in the de re part are "referentially transparent" - coreferential expressions may be exchanged salva veritate; this is not the case in the de dicto-part. >Opacity. I 700 Brandom: but not two kinds of beliefs but of attributions. >Beliefs, >Attributions. I 715 De re/Brandom: de re attribution distinguishes explicitly between the assigned doxastic definition and the substitutional definitions brought in by the attributor E.g. McCarthy believed the first sentence of the Communist Manifesto to be true (de re, not de dicto) - solution: "is true" is embedded here, so it is no truth assessment. I 731 De dicto/Attribution/Brandom: In conceptual terms, what is expressed by de-dicto attributions is locally superior to what is expressed by de-re attributions, but not globally - so de re attributions are true because of a true de dicto attribution - de dicto precedes over de re (in the case of attributions). I 753 De re attributions/Brandom: a) direct speech: square brackets S says [p] - b) indirect speech: S says that p - de-re attribution of assertional speech acts: S says of t that F(it)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
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